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In this Article, we offer a current examination of just how
much the First Amendment does—or does not—confer special
“academic freedom” privileges on members of public university
communities. Most of our focus is doctrinal, although we do
identify and critique various theoretical and functional justifications for and against First Amendment protections along the
way. In a similar vein, many of our observations are descriptive—we try to categorize and analyze what courts, when confronted with modern disputes, do and are likely to do—but at
various points we interject some normative arguments in favor
of a robust role for free speech in the modern public university.
While issues relating to university students and faculty are in
important respects different, we address both in an attempt to
flesh out the meaning of First Amendment academic freedom in
higher education somewhat comprehensively. Our Article discusses First Amendment considerations with respect to students first, and then with respect to faculty. Finally, we close
with some brief observations about legal academic freedom protections that extend beyond the First Amendment realm.
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I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS
OF PUBLIC COLLEGE STUDENTS
Describing the scope and meaning of the academic freedom
of public university students is a daunting task. To some extent, it is a matter of university policy and custom. A university
may elect to permit its students more freedom of speech than it
is required to tolerate by the First Amendment or other legal
mandates—subject of course to limitations imposed by law to
protect the rights of other students or third parties. Our focus
in this Article, however, is on the extent to which the Constitution—in particular, the First Amendment—protects the academic freedom of students and faculty at public colleges and
universities. That question is not susceptible to a clear or easy
answer. Indeed, we freely acknowledge that this Article raises
far more questions than it can even attempt to resolve.
Two branches of free speech doctrine may apply to student
speech on public college campuses. One branch is grounded in
public high school cases that appear to treat the regulation of
student speech on school grounds as a special situation to be
evaluated under a distinctive framework of review. While we
recognize (and address) the fact that the high school and college
settings may differ with regard to compulsory attendance, maturity of students, etc., the analyses drawn from high school
cases are often used as starting points for courts confronting
disputes in the university setting, and sometimes for good reason. So we think it helpful to identify paradigmatic high school
cases up front. In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, the Supreme Court held that school authorities can restrict private student expression only if the speech at
issue materially disrupts the educational program or impinges
1
on the rights of other students. In a subsequent case, Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, the Court also applied an
education-specific framework, although it distinguished Tinker
in holding that student speech in school-sponsored activities
could be restricted as long as the reason for doing so was rea2
sonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.
The other doctrinal branch involves more conventional free
speech doctrine in which the standard of review applied by
courts is determined by examining the nature of the regulation
restricting speech, the location in which the speech occurs, and
1. 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969).
2. 484 U.S. 260, 272–73 (1988).
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the kind of speech being regulated—with the analysis of the location where the speech occurs being particularly vexing.
Courts are tasked with categorizing a speech location as either
a traditional public forum, a designated or limited public fo3
rum, or a non-public forum. This determination is often critical
because the standard of review of different regulations varies
depending on the kind of forum which is at issue. In a traditional public forum, viewpoint- and content-discriminatory regulations receive strict scrutiny and content-neutral regulations
4
receive intermediate level scrutiny. By contrast, in a nonpublic forum—the default category for most public property—
although viewpoint-discriminatory regulations still receive
strict scrutiny, both content-discriminatory and content-neutral
restrictions will be upheld as long as they are found to be reasonable regulations of speech—a relatively lenient standard of
5
review.
The designated and limited public forums are the most difficult to understand, in part because the courts have not always
used these terms consistently or coherently. The designated
public forum is best described as an “area[] that the government has affirmatively opened up generally for expressive pur6
poses.” Speech regulations governing a designated public forum are evaluated under the same rigorous standard of review
7
applied to regulations governing traditional public forums.
Limited public forums are “forums created for, and limited to,
8
specific expressive purposes and speakers.” The standard of
review applied to speech regulations governing limited public
forums is particularly complicated. Enforcement of the parameters for restricting access to the limited public forum for its
specific purpose will be upheld if the parameters are viewpoint9
neutral and reasonable.

3. See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37,
44–46 (1983).
4. Id.
5. Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 677–78, 682
(1998).
6. Alan Brownstein & Vikram Amar, Reviewing Associational Freedom
Claims in a Limited Public Forum: An Extension of the Distinction Between
Debate-Dampening and Debate-Distorting State Action, 38 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 505, 507 (2011).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 506; see also Make the Road by Walking, Inc. v. Turner, 378
F.3d 133, 143 (2d Cir. 2004).
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As intimated earlier, the Tinker line of authority seems entirely distinct from forum doctrine. Indeed, Tinker was decided
before forum doctrine became very fully developed. Perhaps not
surprisingly, the great majority of lower courts treat Tinker as
having created a sui generis standard entirely divorced from
questions about the nature of the forum or the kind of regula10
tion which is at issue. More importantly for our purposes,
Tinker is rarely employed as the proper standard of review for
11
student speech cases at colleges or universities.
The relationship between the Hazelwood analysis and forum doctrine is even harder to understand. The incoherence of
judicial discussions about any meaningful relationship between
the two and the ambiguous analysis of indeterminate factors
discussed within the Hazelwood opinion itself has sown consid12
erable confusion. Moreover, unlike Tinker, Hazelwood has a
reach that in fact has extended to college campuses. While the
Court in Hazelwood explicitly left the issue of the decision’s ap13
plicability to colleges open, the majority of lower courts considering the issue have agreed that Hazelwood applies to the
regulation of school-sponsored student speech at a public uni14
versity at least in some circumstances. Thus, any discussion of
10. See Alan Brownstein, The Nonforum as a First Amendment Category:
Bringing Order out of the Chaos of Free Speech Cases Involving SchoolSponsored Activities, 42 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 717, 730–34, 742–44 (2009).
11. But see DeJohn v. Temple Univ., 537 F.3d 301, 317 (3d Cir. 2008) (applying a Tinker “threat of disruption” standard in evaluating university sexual
harassment policy).
12. See Brownstein, supra note 10, at 744–84.
13. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 n.7 (1988).
14. See, e.g., Jane Doe I v. Valencia Coll. Bd. of Trs., 838 F.3d 1207, 1211
(11th Cir. 2016) (accepting Hazelwood standard for university student speech,
but concluding that activity at issue was not a school-sponsored activity);
Ward v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727, 732–33 (6th Cir. 2012); Keeton v. AndersonWiley, 664 F.3d 865, 874–76 (11th Cir. 2011); Hosty v. Carter, 412 F.3d 731,
734 (7th Cir. 2005) (en banc); Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1285–89
(10th Cir. 2004); Brown v. Li, 308 F.3d 939, 947–51 (9th Cir. 2002); Ala. Student Party v. Student Gov’t Ass’n of the Univ. of Ala., 867 F.2d 1344, 1346–47
(11th Cir. 1989).
Other courts have refused to apply Hazelwood to free speech cases involving students at universities. See, e.g., O’Brien v. Welty, 818 F. 3d 920, 932–33
(9th Cir. 2016) (confirming that the Ninth Circuit has not extended Hazelwood
to the university setting); Oyama v. Univ. of Haw., 813 F.3d 850, 862–63 (9th
Cir. 2015) (explaining that the Ninth Circuit has so far “declined to apply [Hazelwood’s] deferential standard in the university setting” although it has not
formally rejected the standard, either); McCauley v. Univ. of the V.I., 618 F.3d
232, 247, 250 n.12 (3d Cir. 2010) (emphatically insisting that public universities have less leeway in regulating student speech than public elementary or
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student academic freedom on college campuses has to begin
with a deep, if sometimes unsatisfying, analysis of the Hazelwood decision.
Hazelwood involved a free speech claim brought by student
staff members of a high school newspaper published in a graded, faculty-supervised journalism class who challenged the decision by the school’s principal to censor certain articles the pa15
per planned to publish. The federal court of appeals sided with
the students, who argued both that the school had created a
public forum in its operation of the student newspaper and that
the principal’s reasons for censoring the paper could not satisfy
the standard set out by the Supreme Court in Tinker. There
was nothing about the censored articles which suggested that
they would materially disrupt the educational mission of the
16
school or impinge on the rights of other students.
The Supreme Court reversed. Justice White, writing for
the majority, began his analysis by insisting that the free
speech rights of students in public schools were not “coexten17
sive with the rights of adults in other settings.” Government
could censor student speech in a public school that could not
otherwise be censored if it was expressed outside of the school
18
or student settings. The justification for adopting a special
rule for students in public schools was grounded in part on the
nature and function of educational institutions—what the
Court described as “the special characteristics of the school en19
vironment.” To a significant extent, this is little more than
constitutional law embodying common sense. Schools are in the
business of evaluating and regulating speech. The function of
education involves discrimination among ideas, information,

high schools, but also noting cryptically that “we decline to consider whether
the teachings of Hazelwood apply in the university setting”); Kincaid v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 342, 346 (6th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (determining that the district
court erred in applying Hazelwood—a case involving the First Amendment
rights of high school students—to a university setting); Student Gov’t Ass’n v.
Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Mass., 868 F.2d 473, 480 n.6 (1st Cir. 1989) (concluding that Hazelwood is not applicable to cases involving college newspapers).
15. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 262–64.
16. Id. at 265–66.
17. Id. at 266 (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675,
682 (1986)).
18. Id.
19. Id. (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S.
503, 506 (1969)).
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and the styles of expression. Content-neutral education is an
20
oxymoron.
Justice White also alluded to a federalism and separationof-powers foundation for his position. The task of resolving educational issues arising out of the operation of the public schools
should be decided by local school boards, school administrators,
21
and teachers—not federal judges. The federal judiciary should
not become a de facto national school board setting policy for
the country’s schools.
At this point in his opinion, Justice White seemingly reverses course, speaking not of school-specific considerations but
in more familiar forum-analysis terms. Perhaps the Court believed it had to respond to the conclusion of the court of appeals
that the school created a public forum by publishing the student newspaper. In any case, Justice White engages in a conventional forum inquiry and demonstrates, at least to the majority’s satisfaction, that the evidence does not establish by
policy or practice that the school intended to open up the pages
of the newspaper to indiscriminate student use or to relinquish
22
any selective control over the content of the periodical.
This analysis, however, has some built-in limitations: (1) it
applies conventional forum analysis to speech in a high school
setting while school is in session; and (2) it suggests that if
school authorities intentionally create some kind of designated
or limited public forum in a school-sponsored activity, they can
be held to have waived any special prerogatives they might
23
otherwise assert for regulating student speech. More importantly, Justice White’s opinion, perhaps inadvertently, raises another forum question. Generally speaking, public property
that is not a traditional public forum (a street or a park), and
which has not been intentionally opened up by the government
for private expressive purposes, is identified as a non-public fo24
rum. By citing conventional public forum/non-public forum
cases in its discussion of whether the Hazelwood school author20. See Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1287 (10th Cir. 2004).
21. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 267, 273.
22. Id. at 267–71.
23. See id. It is clear that forum analysis applies when schools regulate
access to school facilities that are not being used for the school’s educational
purposes. See, e.g., Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508
U.S. 384, 390–93 (1993); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267–70 (1981). The
creation of a forum in an ongoing school activity is another matter entirely.
24. See Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 677–78
(1998).
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ities have created a designated public forum, Justice White’s
opinion can be read to imply that school-sponsored activities
are by default a non-public forum and should be treated as
25
such. Justice White repeatedly writes that because the school
has not created a full-fledged public forum in the pages of the
student newspaper, it is entitled to regulate the content of the
26
publication in any reasonable way. This reasonableness language parallels the standard of review applied in non-public forum cases and Justice White cites conventional non-public fo27
rum case law to support his conclusion.
We are not convinced that this is the best reading of Ha28
zelwood. We recognize that several district and circuit courts
have interpreted Hazelwood to hold that at least some schoolsponsored activities should be characterized as non-public fo29
rums. Accordingly, these courts conclude that the regulation
of student speech in these activities should be evaluated under
the same standard of review applied to speech regulations in a
non-public forum. Other courts, however, reject this position
and read Hazelwood to create a distinct standard of review for
30
the regulation of speech in school-sponsored activities. This
issue is critically important because while contentdiscriminatory and content-neutral restrictions on speech in a
non-public forum will be upheld as long as they are reasonable,
viewpoint-discriminatory regulations of speech in a non-public
forum receive strict scrutiny review. Thus, if school-sponsored
activities are non-public forums, school administrators and
teachers cannot discriminate on the basis of viewpoint in regulating student speech. Because the question of whether, as a
categorical matter, Hazelwood identifies school-sponsored activities as non-public forums remains contested, the question of
whether school authorities can discriminate on the basis of
viewpoint in regulating school-sponsored activities remains in31
determinate as well.
25. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 267–70.
26. Id. at 267, 270.
27. Id. at 267 (citing Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educator’s Ass’n,
460 U.S. 37 (1983); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc.,
473 U.S. 788 (1985)).
28. See Brownstein, supra note 10, at 776–84.
29. Id. at 777 n.202 (citing cases identifying school-sponsored activities
that may be non-public forums).
30. Id. at 781 n.221 (citing cases that use Hazelwood as a distinct standard).
31. See id. at 776–84 (summarizing arguments that appear on both sides
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After completing its discussion of why the Hazelwood student newspaper is not a public forum, Justice White’s opinion
shifts direction once again. The issue in school-sponsored activities cases is not whether a school must tolerate student
speech, it explains; that was the issue resolved in Tinker for
32
private student speech. When student speech is expressed in a
school-sponsored activity, the issue is whether the First
Amendment requires “a school affirmatively to promote partic33
ular student speech.” School authorities must surely have the
ability to control student speech that community members
“might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the
34
school.” When a school is essentially refusing “to lend its name
and resources to the dissemination of student expression,” its
regulation of student speech will be upheld as long as it is “rea35
sonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.” Only
when the school’s actions serve “no valid educational purpose”
36
does the First Amendment require judicial intervention.
This analysis supports an analogy between the regulation
of school-sponsored activities and yet another First Amendment doctrinal category—so-called government speech. When
the issue is whether government resources will be used directly
or indirectly to promote a particular message, the First
Amendment provides little, if any, constraint on the government’s decisions. Justice White’s language in this part of the
opinion resonates with such an understanding. Asking whether
government decisions are reasonably related to legitimate state
interests or whether they serve no valid purpose smacks of
highly deferential rational basis review. Similarly, the Court
has held that when the government is engaged in a state function that requires the exercise of editorial discretion, the First
Amendment does not require judicial review of the state’s in37
trinsically discretionary decisions. If one were attracted to
this analogy, the open questions would be why the Court in
Hazelwood suggested that there are any real free speech constraints on the messages a school chooses to endorse and, if

of the circuit split).
32. See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 270–71.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 271.
35. Id. at 272–73.
36. Id. at 273.
37. Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 673 (1998).
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some such constraints exist, how exactly a court is to determine
38
what constitutes a legitimate pedagogical purpose.
Finally, Justice White appears to shift course yet again toward the institutional analysis with which he began his opinion. He suggests that the distinctive nature of public schools
requires that educators be given special prerogatives. Schools
must be able to regulate student speech in order to ensure that
39
students learn what the school is trying to teach. Educators
must be able to take into account the maturity level of students, and limit the material students are exposed to accord40
ingly. Administrators need to be able to restrict student
speech in circumstances where the school would be erroneously
41
perceived as endorsing the student’s message. Finally, disputes about what is taught in a public school and how it is
taught are much more a matter for local political and professional decision-making than they are problems to be resolved
42
through federal constitutional adjudication.
As noted earlier, many, but certainly not all, lower courts
have determined that Hazelwood extends to public colleges and
universities. Often the decision to apply or not to apply Hazelwood is conclusory, with little justification offered for the
43
court’s decision. In other cases, the court determines whether
Hazelwood applies to the particular context in which the free
speech dispute arose, but explicitly leaves open the applicabil44
ity of Hazelwood in other circumstances.
Given the intrinsic ambiguity as to Hazelwood’s meaning,
the wariness of some courts to apply Hazelwood in a college
setting is understandable. The case law applying Hazelwood to
free speech disputes in elementary, junior high, and high school

38. What constitutes a legitimate pedagogical purpose, of course, has not
been an easy question for courts to answer. See Brownstein, supra note 10, at
775–76.
39. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 271–72.
42. Id. at 273.
43. See, e.g., Student Gov’t Ass’n v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Mass., 868 F.2d
473, 480 n.6 (1st Cir. 1989) (stating simply that Hazelwood does not apply to
colleges and universities).
44. See, e.g., Oyama v. Univ. of Haw., 813 F.3d 850, 864 n.10 (9th Cir.
2015) (stating that Hazelwood does not apply to the case before it involving
student speech in a professional certification program, but “we need not and
do not decide whether the Hazelwood standard can ever apply in the context of
student speech at the college and university level”).
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settings can be charitably described as an incoherent sham45
bles. There is little reason to believe it will be better reasoned
and more consistent at the college level where courts must confront the additional question of how Hazelwood’s application
should change in the setting of a public university. Yet it is not
remotely clear what framework courts should apply instead of
Hazelwood. Thus, in McCauley v. University of the Virgin Islands, for example, a Third Circuit panel warned that the Hazelwood analysis should not be taken as gospel in adjudicating
free speech cases involving public universities because elementary and high school authorities have more “leeway” in regulat46
ing student speech than their university counterparts. But the
court conceded that “it is difficult to explain how this principle
should be applied in practice and it is unlikely that any broad
47
categorical rules will emerge from its application.” This difficulty of identifying alternative doctrine may help explain the
willingness of some courts to apply Hazelwood in the university
context.
On the merits, there are arguments on both sides as to
whether the Hazelwood analysis should extend to public universities. We can begin by focusing on the situation where a
Hazelwood standard might seem most justified—core curricular
decisions, pedagogical choices, professorial control of the classroom, and the evaluation of research and other student work
product. Hazelwood itself—and lower courts applying its analysis to elementary schools and high schools—suggests that max48
imum deference is due school authorities in these situations.
Is there any basis for thinking that deference in these realms
should not be extended to a university’s administration and
faculty?
One reason identified by some courts relates to the age of
students whose speech is restricted. College students are incrementally older and more emotionally and intellectually mature than public school students. They are deemed to be more
independent and less impressionable than students attending

45. See generally Brownstein, supra note 10, at 719–75 (describing how
lower courts have inconsistently applied Hazelwood).
46. 618 F.3d 232, 247 (3d Cir. 2010).
47. Id.
48. See Brownstein, supra note 10, at 759, 775–76 (describing how various
courts have deferred to schools in cases involving “pedagogical concern[s]” relating to curriculum and classroom decisions).
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49

public schools. College administrators no longer have an in lo50
co parentis relationship with students. They do not need to
impose order and discipline on college students as they would if
51
they were dealing with children attending public school. College students are adults and should have the same free speech
rights as adults. Judges opposed to the application of Hazelwood emphasize some or all of these arguments in explaining
why Hazelwood provides an inappropriate framework for adjudicating free speech cases.
All of these contentions are accurate at least to some extent, but it is not altogether clear why this differential in age
should be a determinant factor in resolving the deference due
administrators and instructors in free speech disputes. This is
particularly true in light of the current Court’s apparent disposition to treat the free speech rights of teenagers to be largely
52
equivalent to the free speech rights of adults. There is a far
greater difference in age and maturity between a student in elementary school and a student in high school than there is between a high school senior and a community college freshman,
53
and yet Hazelwood applies across this age spectrum. It may
be true that the age and maturity of students are relevant to an
evaluation of the pedagogical purpose of a challenged re54
striction on speech —perhaps a middle school English teacher
49. See, e.g., Oyama, 813 F.3d at 863; McCauley, 618 F.3d at 246.
50. See, e.g., McCauley, 618 F.3d at 243–45.
51. See, e.g., id. at 245–46; DeJohn v. Temple Univ., 537 F.3d 301, 315–16
(3d Cir. 2008) (explaining the special need of public elementary and secondary
school administrators to maintain discipline, a concern that is largely lacking
at the university level).
52. See Brown v. Merch. Entm’t Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 790–99 (2011) (relying on traditional First Amendment doctrine to examine a statute prohibiting
the sale of violent video games to minors). In B.H. ex rel. Hawk v. Easton Area
School District, a student free speech case challenging restrictions at a public
high school, the court quoted Brown in affirming that “‘minors are entitled to a
significant measure of First Amendment protection’ and the government does
not ‘have a free floating power to restrict the ideas to which children may be
exposed.’” 725 F.3d 293, 314 (3d Cir. 2013) (en banc) (citation omitted) (quoting Brown, 564 U.S. at 794).
53. See generally Hosty v. Carter, 412 F.3d 731, 734 (7th Cir. 2005) (en
banc) (“[M]any high school seniors are older than some college freshmen and
junior colleges are similar to many high schools.”).
54. See, e.g., Ward v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727, 734 (6th Cir. 2012) (suggesting
that, in some instances, whether a student is in high school or college could be
determinative); Hosty, 412 F.3d at 734 (emphasizing differences in emotional
maturity); Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1289–90 (10th Cir. 2004)
(noting maturity differences between high school and college students);
Pompeo v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of N.M., 58 F. Supp. 3d 1187, 1190 (D.N.M.
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may legitimately limit speech about human sexuality that
might be an entirely reasonable subject of discussion in a col55
lege literature class —but the standard of review applied
would be the same in both cases.
Most importantly, the lack of maturity of students in public schools was only one of the grounds the Court asserted to
justify the Hazelwood standard of review. And in our judgment
it was probably the least important. The core arguments underlying the Hazelwood decision were the need to control student
speech in school-sponsored activities in order to accomplish the
school’s pedagogical goals and the repeated concern about controlling expression that bore the imprimatur of the school. To
what extent do these interests change if the school in question
is a university instead of a high school?
One plausible response to this question asserts that the
mission of the university is fundamentally different than that
of a public school. The function of the university isn’t to instill
orthodoxy; it is to encourage inquiry and debate in the unfet56
tered marketplace of ideas. Students need some degree of academic freedom to develop the creativity and analytic skills that
are necessary to develop new knowledge and engage an increas57
ingly changing world. Freedom of speech is the foundation of
the role that public universities play in our society and that
freedom extends to student speech in the college classroom as
58
well as the university at large.

2014) (discussing relevance of maturity expectations to examination of a
course syllabus).
55. See, e.g., Ward, 667 F.3d at 734.
56. See, e.g., DeJohn, 537 F.3d at 315 (“It is well recognized that ‘the college classroom with its surrounding environs is peculiarly the marketplace of
ideas . . . .’” (quoting Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972))).
57. As the court in Oyama v. University of Hawaii explained in justifying
the importance of academic freedom and student free speech rights in a public
university, “the progress of our professions . . . may depend upon the ‘discord
and dissent’ of students training to enter them: it is by challenging the inherited wisdom of their respective fields that the next generation of professionals
may develop solutions to the problems that vexed their predecessors.” 813 F.3d
850, 864 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Rodriguez v. Maricopa Cty. Cmt. Coll. Dist.,
605 F.3d 703, 708 (9th Cir. 2010)). Accordingly, any adjudication of public college student free speech claims must “reflect the ‘special niche’ universities
occupy ‘in our constitutional tradition.’” Id. (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 306, 329 (2003)). Significantly, “the Court’s [high school] student speech
cases provide no basis for doing so.” Id.
58. See, e.g., McCauley v. Univ. of the V.I., 618 F.3d 232, 242 (3d Cir.
2010) (discussing the “‘critical importance’ free speech has in our public uni-
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We appreciate the force of this argument, but there is a
contrary argument that deserves attention as well. Inquiry and
debate in a college classroom may require orchestration. The
goal of having numerous ideas expressed and evaluated may be
starkly inconsistent with the right of each student to express
what he or she thinks is important during a class discussion.
Further, not all ideas are of equal relevance or merit. Nor are
59
all sources of information of equal quality or veracity. A university classroom is not a public forum where all speech must
60
be accepted on a content-neutral basis.
Also, the university’s role as a certifying or credentialing
institution must be more stringent than a public school’s. A
high school may strive to have all students develop and learn to
the best of their ability. Graduation does not necessarily
demonstrate competence in any specific area of expertise or for
any particular vocation. A university degree purports to recognize that the graduate has a body of knowledge and skills that
are necessary for employment in a particular field or more advanced, specialized study. Indeed, the more advanced the
course of study, the more important it is that students master
61
particular material and skills. Many programs involve stuversities” (quoting DeJohn, 537 F.3d at 314)); DeJohn, 537 F.3d at 315 (“Discussion by adult students in a college classroom should not be restricted.”).
59. In Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, for example, the court found the reasoning
of Settle v. Dickson County School Board, a high school case, to be fully applicable to a college free speech case. See Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1287 (citing
Settle v. Dickson Cty. Sch. Bd., 53 F.3d 152, 155–56 (6th Cir. 1995)). Settle explained that
teachers, like judges, must daily decide which arguments are relevant, which computations are correct, which analogies are good or
bad, and when it is time to stop writing or talking. . . . [I]t is the essence of the teacher’s responsibility in the classroom to draw lines
and make distinctions—in a word to encourage speech germane to the
topic at hand and discourage speech unlikely to shed light on the subject. Teachers therefore must be given broad discretion to give grades
and conduct class discussion based on the content of speech.
Settle, 53 F.3d at 155–56; see also Ward, 667 F.3d at 733–34 (explaining that
the key common denominator in high school and college student free speech
cases is “student” and that, during instructional activities at both levels,
teachers need the authority to restrict student speech in order to further pedagogical goals).
60. See, e.g., Keeton v. Anderson-Wiley, 664 F.3d 865, 872 (11th Cir. 2011)
(finding that Augusta State University’s counseling program constituted a
non-public forum).
61. See Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1290–91 (implying that the need for academic discipline does not necessarily diminish as students grow older and
that, indeed, the need for rigorous control over the educational environment
may increase as the course of study progresses).
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dents participating in field work or directly providing services
62
to clients as part of their training. In many cases, the parameters of permissible debate necessarily narrow to satisfy the
university’s role in establishing and confirming competency and
63
awarding credentials.
Perhaps most importantly, rigorous judicial review of a
teacher, department, or university’s educational decisions in
the name of protecting student speech risks subordinating the
academic freedom of the faculty and institution to the expressive prerogatives of students—and it assigns to the federal
courts the authority to determine what constitutes acceptable
64
pedagogical and educational standards. Here there is an additional distinction between the high school and university context, but it is a distinction that does not necessarily undermine
the propriety of adjudicating certain student speech disputes at
a university under Hazelwood.
The separation-of-powers and federalism concerns which
supported judicial deference to local school boards and school
administrators in Hazelwood may be less important in a college
65
context. Public universities are not always under the control
62. See, e.g., Keeton, 664 F.3d at 876 (recognizing the student clinical
practicum in which students are trained to counsel clients is school-sponsored
activity which bears the imprimatur of the university). When students’ speech
is restricted while they are actually providing counseling to clients as part of
their professional training, some courts evaluate such speech regulations under the doctrinal framework applied to restrictions on public employee speech.
See, e.g., Watts v. Fla. Int’l Univ., 495 F.3d 1289, 1294 (11th Cir. 2007) (ruling
that the test for regulating private speech of employees applied because Watts
was not simply a student, but an employee of the counseling practicum).
63. See, e.g., Oyama v. Univ. of Haw., 813 F.3d 850, 866–72 (9th Cir.
2015) (finding that the university had “legitimate concerns” and could “take
action” to deny him certification); Emily Gold Waldman, University Imprimaturs on Student Speech: The Certification Cases, 11 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 382,
413 (2013) (noting the existence of “significant deference [to universities] in
the certification cases”).
64. Federal judges, not surprisingly, are often wary of assuming any such
role. See, e.g., Keeton, 664 F.3d at 883 (Pryor, J., concurring) (“In matters of
instruction and academic programs, federal judges must . . . exercise restraint.”).
65. It is worth noting that some conservative members of the current
Court seem far less interested in separation of powers and federalism concerns
in the student speech context than the Justices who formed the Hazelwood
majority. To these Justices, school authorities are state actors and there is
every reason to be as suspicious of their decisions to restrict student speech as
the speech restrictive decisions of any other government official. See, e.g.,
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 422–25 (2007) (Alito, J., concurring) (arguing that public school authorities “act as agents of the State” when they regulate student speech).
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of an elected board. Moreover, the idea that publicly elected officials should control the operation of a public university has
nowhere near the persuasive traction of the argument that elementary schools and high schools should be under local, democratically established control. Indeed, the opposite is the case.
It is often recognized that the university as an institution needs
considerable autonomy and academic freedom to do its job effectively.
While this last argument may persuasively distinguish
public colleges from public high schools in one sense, it may be
a pyrrhic victory for the purpose of arguing for less judicial deference to college administrators and faculty in student speech
cases. The commitment to university institutional autonomy
66
and the academic freedom of departments and faculty may
provide an even stronger impetus to, and foundation for, judicial deference than the arguments for local control of public
schools. And there is no comparable tradition or functional justification for recognizing the institutional autonomy of public
schools or the academic freedom of their instructional staff.
The final foundation for applying Hazelwood to universities relates to student expression that bears the imprimatur of
the school. There is no plausible basis for arguing that student
speech in a classroom could be reasonably perceived to bear the
imprimatur of the school when students are asked to express
67
their own views on a subject. But that is true both for discussions in high school and college classes. The approval of written
work and research projects is more problematic. No one will
think that the student handing in his or her assignment is
speaking for the school. However, by accepting and positively
evaluating student work product, the school is arguably giving
the content of the project an imprimatur of approval.
This concern has been accepted by some courts adjudicating disputes involving the certification of students for professional roles such as a teacher. Thus, as one court explained:
66. See, e.g., Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529
U.S. 217, 237 (2000) (Souter, J., concurring) (citing Regents of the Univ. of
Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 226 (1985)) (“Academic freedom thrives not only
on the independent and uninhibited exchange of ideas among teachers and
students, but also, and somewhat inconsistently, on autonomous
decisionmaking by the academy itself.”); Brown v. Li, 308 F.3d 939, 951 (9th
Cir. 2002) (“[T]he curriculum of a public educational institution is one means
by which the institution itself expresses its policy, a policy with which others
do not have a constitutional right to interfere.”).
67. Keeton, 664 F.3d at 882 (Pryor, J., concurring).
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“When the University recommends a student for certification
[as a teacher], it communicates to the world that, in its view,
that student is fit to practice the profession; as a result, the
University places its ‘imprimatur’ on each student it approves
68
to teach.” Arguably, the scope of this argument may apply to
degrees which do not involve formal certification as well.
There is one additional reason to doubt that college students have greater free speech rights than their junior high
school or high school counterparts. Public school students are
subject to compulsory education laws. They are required to attend school and in doing so subject themselves to the school’s
speech regulations. College students have the opportunity to
examine the curriculum of a college beforehand and will make
the decision to attend a particular university as a matter of
choice. There is at least an argument that this lack of compulsion counts against a university student’s challenge to curricu69
lar or pedagogical decisions that limit his or her speech.
We do not purport to choose sides on the propriety of applying Hazelwood to university student speech disputes arising
out of core school-sponsored activities. There are strong arguments both for applying and for rejecting Hazelwood and perhaps even stronger arguments for applying it in one context but
not another. Our primary point is to demonstrate the uncertainty that pervades the adjudication of these cases as a constitutional matter. If uncertainty as to whether a right or freedom
will be protected chills the exercise of that right, students allegedly exercising their free speech rights in school-sponsored
activities at a university may experience some cold drafts while
doing so.
As a descriptive matter, we think in many cases that college students will have a difficult time successfully asserting
free speech challenges against university decisions regarding
the content of courses and pedagogy in the classroom or with
regard to the supervision and evaluation of research and writ70
ing projects. This does not mean, however, that students will
68. Oyama, 813 F.3d at 862; see also Waldman, supra note 63, at 393 (discussing how students certified by a university bear its imprimatur).
69. See, e.g., Ward v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727, 734 (6th Cir. 2012) (“A prospective university student has the capacity to learn what a curriculum requires
before applying to the school and before matriculating there.”).
70. See, e.g., Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1288 (10th Cir.
2004) (quoting Brown, 308 F.3d at 949 with approval) (confirming that student
free speech cases “make clear that the First Amendment does not require an
educator to change the assignment to suit the student’s opinion or to approve
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always be without redress. As we explained earlier, some courts
interpret Hazelwood to be grounded in non-public forum doctrine. In these circuits, an argument that college classroom or
research and writing restrictions constitute viewpoint discrim71
ination cannot be dismissed out of hand.
Even if a court does not hold that viewpoint discrimination
72
necessarily requires strict scrutiny review, courts recognize
that as a general matter, viewpoint discrimination runs counter to core free speech principles. Accordingly, while applying
deferential review, a court may still be uneasy with the argument that viewpoint discrimination serves a valid pedagogical
purpose. Certainly, college students may not be punished because they hold or express religious or political beliefs that are
inconsistent with the passionately held opinions of college ad73
ministrators or professors. However, establishing that a professor or department’s decision restricting speech is based on
animus toward a student’s religious or political beliefs rather
than permissible academic or professional evaluations of the
quality of the student’s work and her commitment to academic
or professional standards may be a very difficult burden of
74
proof for a student to satisfy.
There is an unstated due process dimension to freedom of
speech claims on campus that may also provide some incidental
protection to students. Courts may be suspicious of academic or
professional standards asserted to justify speech restrictions
that are recognized for the first time after a student’s speech
has been sanctioned and she has challenged the university’s
75
decision. When after-the-fact rationalizations are offered to
the work of a student that, in his or her judgment, fails to meet a legitimate
academic standard”).
71. See, e.g., Keeton, 664 F.3d at 871–77 (characterizing master’s program
in counseling to be a non-public forum requiring viewpoint neutrality and recognizing the applicability of Hazelwood to review of the program’s requirements).
72. See, e.g., Pompeo v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of N.M., 58 F. Supp. 3d
1187, 1189 (D.N.M. 2014) (holding that Hazelwood does not require viewpoint
neutrality in the regulation of a student’s curricular speech).
73. Keeton, 664 F.3d at 872; Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1293.
74. See, e.g., Keeton, 664 F.3d at 872–75 (discussing student’s difficulty in
proving discrimination on the basis of her stated religious beliefs); id. at 880–
83 (Pryor, J., concurring) (noting that a public university cannot discriminate
against student speech simply because it is concerned “that the student might,
in a variety of other circumstances, express views at odds with the preferred
viewpoints of the university”).
75. See, e.g., Ward v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727, 736 (6th Cir. 2012) (discussing
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defend a university’s actions, courts may be more open to the
argument that the university is attempting to conceal impermissible motives. Similarly, courts may not countenance the
sand-bagging of students by changing standards to exclude unpopular speech. Thus, a professor who describes the content of
a course as controversial and invites disagreement with the
professor’s views in the syllabus will have difficulty explaining
why a particular student’s speech on a class assignment is un76
acceptable and requires the student’s exclusion from the class.
There is also a distinction drawn between the regulation of
speech in a school-sponsored activity and retaliation against
students who express disagreement about the content or operation of a school-sponsored activity. A student who privately
complains to an instructor or the administration about class
requirements and is threatened with sanctions for doing so is
engaged in protected expression which does not bear the im77
primatur of the school. While students may be required to
comply with curricular demands with which they disagree, they
have a free speech right to express that disagreement in appro78
priate circumstances.
What if a university restricts student speech in an activity
that is not a part of the curriculum, but is arguably sufficiently
school-sponsored to still fall within the analytic rubric of Hazelwood? Lower courts have struggled to determine the parameters of Hazelwood in public school cases. The resulting attempts to distinguish school-sponsored from non-schoolsponsored activities have produced a hodge-podge of incon79
sistent holdings.
Some, but certainly not all, of this confusion may be avoided in university cases because there are strong reasons for narrowing the range of non-curricular activities to which Hazelwood applies on a university campus. College student
organizations are often considered to be more independent of
the university than public school clubs and activities. The uni-

the possibility that a reasonable jury could find the university’s policy on referrals “an after-the-fact invention”).
76. Pompeo, 58 F. Supp. 3d at 1190.
77. Jane Doe I v. Valencia Coll. Bd. of Trs., 838 F.3d 1207, 1211 (11th Cir.
2016).
78. Keeton, 664 F.3d at 874 (explaining that a student remains free to express disagreement with the curriculum of a university’s counseling program,
but she must abide by the professional requirements imposed by the program).
79. See Brownstein, supra note 10, at 758–70.
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versity student group is less likely to have a faculty sponsor.
The range of student organizations on a college campus is typically so broad and involves so many diverse perspectives that it
would be impossible to believe that the university endorses all
80
of their discordant expressive activities. Thus, in many cases
there is little risk that student speech outside of curricular activities will be understood to bear the imprimatur of the school.
Indeed, universities often explicitly disclaim any suggestion
that they endorse the expressive activities of student organiza81
tions. No one sensibly thinks that the University of Illinois
Student Republican Club reflects the political position of the
university administration or its faculty.
There are other non-curricular student activities which are
sponsored by universities and which the university maintains
are intended to further specific educational goals. Student governments are one example. Here, for instance, courts have held
that restrictions on participation in a student government election and the regulation of electioneering activities are reviewa82
ble under a Hazelwood analysis. University student newspapers and other periodicals are also alleged to serve educational
purposes and courts have considered Hazelwood in reviewing
83
university restrictions on the content of these publications.
In this regard, it is clear that money matters and the fact
that a university funds a student activity or periodical may
support deferential review of restrictions on student speech
under Hazelwood or under government speech doctrine which
permits the government to control the messages it expresses or

80. Indeed, when a university sponsors a broad range of student organizations, it will be held to have created a limited public forum. See, e.g., Christian
Legal Soc’y Chapter of Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of Law v. Martinez, 561
U.S. 661, 674 (2010) (noting that the law school created a limited public forum
through its Registered Student Organization requirements); Rosenberger v.
Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829–30 (1995) (ruling that the
Student Activities Fund, which funded many student groups, created a limited
public forum).
81. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 823–24.
82. See, e.g., Ala. Student Party v. Student Gov’t Ass’n of the Univ. of Ala.,
867 F.2d. 1344 (11th Cir. 1989) (applying Hazelwood analysis to university
regulations of student government campaign literature and debates); Flint v.
Dennison, 361 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1218–20 (D. Mont. 2005) (applying Hazelwood analysis to spending limits for student government elections).
83. See, e.g., Hosty v. Carter, 412 F.3d 731, 735–38 (7th Cir. 2005) (en
banc) (holding that Hazelwood’s framework applies to subsidized student
newspapers).
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subsidizes. However, the presence or absence of university
funding is not dispositive in determining how rigorously courts
should review the regulation of university-subsidized student
expressive activities. The fact that a university student newspaper is financially self-sufficient from advertising revenue
standing alone may not conclusively establish its independence
from university control. One can imagine a situation in which a
financially self-sufficient student newspaper was created with
university capital, bears the university’s name, and has always
been subject to close administrative or faculty supervision of its
content. These would be relevant factors for a court to consider
in determining the appropriate standard of review to apply to
censorship of the periodical.
Similarly, the existence of university funding does not necessarily support deferential judicial review. University subsidies can be provided in such a manner that courts will find that
the university has created some kind of public forum for diverse
85
student expression. That finding would require the application of strict scrutiny for content- and viewpoint-discriminatory
regulations of speech. Although it is uncommon, in some circumstances, state law explicitly declares that a student news86
paper at a public university constitutes a public forum.
A particular thorny question may arise when student
groups invite controversial speakers to campus, sometimes
with the indirect or direct financial support of the university. If
these events are considered to be school-sponsored activities,
speech restrictions limiting disturbances of the speaker’s lecture can be upheld under highly deferential review. It is at
least arguable that greater protection might be extended to the
84. Id.
85. See, e.g., Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 824–29 (deeming legal principles
pertaining to limited public forums applicable to university’s Student Activities Fund, the goal of which was “to support a broad range of extracurricular
student activities that ‘are related to the educational purpose of the University’”); Hosty, 412 F.3d at 737 (stating that the rules established by the Student
Communications Media Board composed of both students and faculty members, pertaining to a subsidized student publication, “could be thought . . . to
create a designated public forum”); Kincaid v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 342, 351 (6th
Cir. 2001) (en banc) (finding that university-subsidized yearbook constituted a
limited public forum); Lueth v. St. Clair Cty. Cmty. Coll., 732 F. Supp. 1410,
1415 (E.D. Mich. 1990) (deeming university’s student-run, university-funded
newspaper “a forum for public expression”).
86. See, e.g., Moore v. Watson, 838 F. Supp. 2d 735, 755–56 (N.D. Ill.
2012) (recognizing that by virtue of Illinois state law, the student newspaper
at a public university constitutes a designated public forum).
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“heckling” of a speaker in a non-academic setting. The argument that the invited speaker’s lecture is a school-sponsored
activity would most likely be enhanced if an academic department or unit co-sponsors the event—a not uncommon occurrence.
Finally, we confront the regulation of student speech that
cannot be characterized as school-sponsored. Off campus, students are residents of a municipality and state. They are subject to all of the laws restricting speech that govern the expression of non-students. And they are protected by the same free
speech doctrine that applies to everyone else in the community.
To what extent does this analysis change when students engage in expressive activities on campus?
The problem is complicated for several reasons. As noted
previously, courts have recognized the historic function of the
university as a location where new, creative, unorthodox, and
critical ideas can be exchanged and debated. In modern times
at least, that tradition of open thought and experiment and a
corresponding abstract commitment to freedom of speech has
88
extended to students. That understanding supports a constitutional regime protecting the free speech rights of students—
even in circumstances in which their speech would not be protected off campus.
Conversely, there is the reality that the university owns
most, if not all, campus property. In a conventional town, most
suppliers of goods and services, such as restaurants, stores, and
apartment buildings are under private ownership. The government has no authority to restrict the private speech of patrons in such locations. The private owners of these enterprises
on the other hand have no constitutional constraints limiting
their authority to control expressive activities of patrons on
their property. When the university takes on these conventionally private roles, we might evaluate its ability to restrict student speech under various models. All such property might be
considered to be a non-public forum unless it is deliberately
87. In In re Kay, for example, the California Supreme Court concluded
that while no one has a free speech right to disrupt or obstruct a meeting,
some negative expressive conduct from the audience such as heckling, interruptions, asking hard questions, and booing would receive some First
Amendment protection. 464 P.2d 142, 147 (Cal. 1970). Whether allegedly disruptive conduct could be sanctioned required a multi-factor analysis examining both the nature of the meeting and the extent to which the protestors’ conduct had substantially impaired the event. Id. at 150–51.
88. See, e.g., Bowman v. White, 444 F.3d 967, 979 (8th Cir. 2006).
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opened up for expressive purposes. Alternatively, the university acting as a proprietor rather than a regulator might be given
the same authority to restrict the speech of its student patrons
as a private landlord or restaurant owner. Yet another alternative suggests that because the university controls the entire
environment in which students live, because a college campus
is recognized as a location where speech and unorthodox ideas
should be freely and robustly exchanged (both inside and outside the classroom), and because students are self-actualizing
individuals with dignity interests deserving of respect, university restrictions on speech in the general campus must be sub89
ject to some level of serious review.
Even if we put areas where the university operates as a
proprietor, such as dormitories and dining halls, aside, there
are no easy answers to the question of how student free speech
rights vary by campus location. The uses to which property is
put on a university campus are extraordinarily diverse.
A modern university contains a variety of fora. Its facilities may include private offices, classrooms, laboratories, academic medical centers, concert halls, large sports stadiums and arenas, and open spaces
. . . . [O]pen spaces . . . at most major universities, come in a number
of different types. Some are enclosed quadrangles bordered on all
sides by university buildings and traversed by sidewalks, while others
90
are grassy areas or plazas on the edge of campus . . . .

The analogies available to us remain ambiguous. The
streets and parks of a town are traditional public forums where
91
speech is provided maximum constitutional protection. All
other public property is a non-public forum unless the govern89. One court noted the following in explaining why college administrators should have less leeway in regulating student speech than high school
administrators:
[U]niversity students, unlike public elementary and high school students, often reside in dormitories on campus, so they remain subject
to university rules at almost all hours of the day. The concept of the
“schoolhouse gate” . . . and the idea that students may lose some aspects of their First Amendment right to freedom of speech while in
school . . . does not translate well to an environment where the student is constantly within the confines of the schoolhouse.
McCauley v. Univ. of the V.I., 618 F.3d 232, 247 (3d Cir. 2009).
90. Bowman, 444 F.3d at 976–77; see also Bloedorn v. Grube, 631 F.3d
1218, 1232 (11th Cir. 2011) (explaining that because the public university at
issue includes “classrooms, lecture halls, private offices, laboratories, dormitories, a performing arts center, sports facilities, open spaces, a botanical garden, a planetarium, a center for wildlife education, and a museum[,] . . . any
attempt to affix a single label on so large and diverse a campus likely would
render the forum analysis meaningless”).
91. Bowman, 444 F.3d at 975–76.
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ment intentionally opens the property up for general or specific
expressive purposes—with the government waiving any right of
selective review of the speakers granted access to the so-called
92
designated or limited public forum. The parameters of the
traditional public forum are jealously guarded by doctrine. An
interior sidewalk leading to a post office, for example, is a non93
public forum. While the fact that people may come and go at
will on public property is relevant to an analysis of whether a
public forum exists, it is only one factor to consider and is not
94
dispositive of the issue.
Should the walkways, paths, and park-like open spaces on
a university campus be analogized to municipal streets and
95
parks or are they more appropriately analogized to an interior
96
sidewalk and characterized as a non-public forum? And what
92. Id.
93. United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 730 (1990).
94. United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983).
95. Some courts have noted the resemblance between a university campus
and a municipality. In Hays County Guardian v. Supple, for example, the
court described Southwest Texas State University in these terms:
Roughly 5,000 students live and work on the campus, making the
campus, in the words of the University’s own promotional booklet, a
“town” of which the resident student will be a “contributing citizen”
and “voting member.” The campus’s function as the site of a community of full-time residents makes it “a place where people may enjoy
the open air or the company of friends and neighbors in a relaxed environment[ ]” . . . and suggests an intended role more akin to a public
street or park than a non-public forum.
969 F.2d 111, 117 (5th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted) (quoting Heffron v. Int’l
Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 651 (1981)).
96. While most courts do not conclude that a street-like or park-like area
on a college campus is a traditional public forum, the case law remains uncertain and provides little in the way of clear standards or guidelines for adjudicating location-based free speech disputes. In Brister v. Faulkner, for example,
the court held that university property linking the city sidewalk to the entrance to a university events center was a public forum for constitutional purposes because the property at issue was indistinguishable from the public
sidewalk adjacent to it. 214 F.3d 675, 682–83 (5th Cir. 2000). Similarly, the
court held in McGlone v. Bell that perimeter sidewalks surrounding a public
university, which were owned by the university but were adjacent to and indistinguishable from municipal sidewalks, were properly characterized as a
traditional public forum. 681 F.3d 718, 732–33 (6th Cir. 2012).
Most open areas within a campus, however, will not be misunderstood to
be municipal streets or parks and will be understood to be university, rather
than municipal, property. Determining how such internal campus property
should be characterized for free speech purposes has proven to be a problematic task. In Bowman v. White, the court explained that because a university
serves different functions than municipal streets, parks, or theaters, “streets,
sidewalks, and other open areas that might otherwise be traditional public
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about all of the other campus property which is used for myriad
different purposes? Is all other university property by default a
97
non-public forum? While courts are reluctant to identify a
campus location as a traditional public forum, clearly, in some
fora may be treated differently when they fall within the boundaries of [a]
[u]niversity’s vast campus.” 444 F.3d at 978. Judge Bye’s concurring opinion,
however, challenged the majority’s analysis. He argued that locations on a
university campus that have the physical characteristics of streets and parks
and are used as open public thoroughfares are traditional public forums. Id. at
984–91 (Bye, J., concurring). In Souders v. Lucero, the court determined that
even an open college campus is not a public forum similar to streets and parks
as to which both students and nonstudents alike have a right of access. 196
F.3d 1040, 1044 (9th Cir. 1999). In Gilles v. Garland, an opinion regrettably
not selected for publication, the court held that open space at a public university identified as the academic quad was a limited public forum. 281 F. App’x
501, 510–11 (6th Cir. 2008). Accordingly, speech regulations governing such
areas would be upheld as long as they were content-neutral and reasonable.
While concurring in the judgment, Judge Moore challenged that conclusion
and argued that a majority of circuits have held that open spaces on a college
campus are designated public forums. Id. at 513–14 (Moore, J., concurring). As
such, speech regulations governing designated public forums would be subject
to strict scrutiny review. Id. at 514 (Moore, J., concurring). In yet another
case, American Civil Liberties Union v. Mote, a public university permitted
members of the university community to engage in public speaking and distribute handbills in outdoor areas of campus. 423 F.3d 438, 442 (4th Cir.
2005). Members of the general public were permitted access to these same
outdoor areas for virtually all purposes except for public speaking and the distribution of leaflets. Id. Only university community members were permitted
to engage in these expressive activities in most open outdoor campus locations.
Id. The court determined that these campus areas were a non-public forum by
default. Id. at 444. However, because they had been opened for particular expressive uses, they now constituted a limited public forum. Id. As such, speech
restrictions governing their use would be upheld if they were viewpointneutral and reasonable in light of their purpose. Id. at 445.
Examining the issues from yet another perspective, in Bloedorn v. Grube,
the court concluded that neither an on-campus interior sidewalk, a pedestrian
mall, nor a rotunda could be characterized as a traditional public forum. 631
F.3d 1218, 1232–34 (11th Cir. 2011). While the physical characteristics of these locations on campus certainly resembled streets and parks, the physical
characteristics of the property standing alone “cannot dictate forum analysis.”
Id. at 1233. Most importantly, the traditional purpose and use of university
property is distinct from the purpose and customary uses of municipal streets
and parks. Id. at 1233–34. After considering the university’s regulations limiting access to the campus for expressive purposes, the court concluded that the
locations at issue were properly determined to be a limited public forum. Id. at
1235. See generally Nathan W. Kellum, If It Looks Like a Duck . . . Traditional
Public Forum Status of Open Areas on Public University Campuses, 33
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1 (2005) (discussing how many universities’ positions
toward free speech on campus run afoul of Supreme Court decisions).
97. See, e.g., O’Brien v. Welty, 818 F.3d 920, 931 (9th Cir. 2016) (finding
that second floor hallway and offices of the social sciences building was a nonpublic forum).
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circumstances the university will be held to have created a des98
ignated or limited public forum. When it does so, students receive increased protection in those locations against contentdiscriminatory speech regulations. However, determining what
constitutes a designated or limited public forum can be a con99
fusing problem for lower courts to resolve as a matter of law
and in many cases, it will require a fact-specific analysis based
100
on the adjudication of disputed facts.
All of this indeterminacy is no friend to freedom of speech.
Uncertainty chills speech. As a Fifth Circuit panel explained in
a case involving the status of university property at the University of Texas, Austin,
If individuals are left to guess whether they have crossed some invisible line between a public and non-public forum, and if that line divides two worlds—one in which they are free to engage in free speech,
and another in which they can be held criminally liable for that
speech—then there can be no doubt that some will be less likely to
pursue their constitutional rights, even in the world where their
101
speech would be protected.

It would seem, however, that some significant degree of
uncertainty is unavoidable in a context where different uses of
property with correspondingly different statuses as a traditional public forum, designated public forum, limited public forum,
and non-public forum exist in a patchwork quilt of free speech
regimes. Courts have recognized that “fora have geographical
102
boundaries [and] different kinds of fora may abut.” In such
circumstances by taking a single step, students may find their
98. See, e.g., Bowman, 444 F.3d at 978–79 (holding that specific open areas in a public university are unlimited designated public forums accessible
both to student and non-student speakers); Hays Cty. Guardian, 969 F.2d at
118 (holding that the university’s outdoor premises where student expression
was routinely permitted constituted a designated public forum).
99. See, e.g., Bowman, 444 F.3d at 975 (describing lower court forum decisions as far from lucid and involving substantial confusion). The confusion exists at all levels of decision-making. In Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, for
example, the Supreme Court applied the same deferential standard of review
previously thought to be reserved for non-public forums to speech and association regulations governing what the Court described as a limited public forum.
See Brownstein & Amar, supra note 6, at 507–08.
100. See, e.g., Bowman, 444 F.3d at 979 (explicitly limiting its designated
public forum holding to only the three areas on campus at issue in the case
before it); Brister, 214 F.3d at 683 n.5 (noting that the public forum holding
applies only to the specific property at issue in the case and does not apply to
any other property in the vicinity).
101. Brister, 214 F.3d at 682–83.
102. Students for Life USA v. Waldrop, 162 F. Supp. 3d 1216, 1232 (S.D.
Ala. 2016).
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free speech rights transformed from the full panoply of constitutional protection to far more limited protection that accepts
103
substantial restrictions on speech.
If university property is generally characterized as a nonpublic forum, student free speech rights might be sharply restricted. Content-discriminatory speech regulations would be
upheld as long as they are reasonable—a very deferential
standard of review. Pursuant to accepted Supreme Court authority, the government may restrict controversial speech and
political advocacy in a non-public forum in order to maintain an
104
appearance of neutrality. Following this line of reasoning, at
least one district court has upheld a university’s restrictions on
student speech near the perimeter of the campus for the purpose of avoiding any suggestion that the university was taking
105
a position on divisive political issues. Even in a non-public forum, students would still have free speech rights against view106
point-discriminatory restrictions on their expression. That is
not insignificant protection. Still, because students would have
greater protection against content-discriminatory laws in those
locations where the university has created a designated or
broadly defined limited public forum, determining whether a
campus location is a public or non-public forum has considerable importance.
The line drawing here may be particularly acute when university administrators struggle to respond to campus protests.
One problem involves challenges to the university’s commitment to viewpoint neutrality. It is black letter free speech doctrine that the university cannot treat certain protests more or
less favorably than others because of the message the protestors are expressing. Content-neutral time, place, and manner
rules may be enforced and will be upheld if they are reasonable
in a non-public forum or satisfy intermediate level scrutiny in a
traditional or limited public forum. But the key requirement is
that these regulations must be enforced neutrally and equally.

103. Id.
104. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 808–10
(1985).
105. Waldrop, 162 F. Supp. 3d at 1234–36.
106. See, e.g., Gerlich v. Leath, No 4:14-CV-00264-JEG, 2015 WL 4097755,
at *7 (S.D. Iowa Jan. 6, 2015) (ruling that viewpoint-discriminatory decision
restricting student organization’s message on t-shirts would violate the First
Amendment).
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This is easier said than done. Often the police and administrative authorities responding to a campus protest are confronted with hard choices. The rigid enforcement of campus
time, place, and manner rules against protestors may exacerbate an incident and result in greater disorder and danger to
third parties. It may often seem advisable to waive the enforcement of the campus rules at least temporarily. The problem arises when other protestors insist that they be granted
the same accommodation and relaxation of campus speech regulations that prior protestors expressing a different message
received. It may be that the facts on the ground do not warrant
waiving speech regulations for the second protest. But that difference in treatment may be difficult to defend after the fact
when the most obvious difference between two protests is that
one group of protestors was allowed to violate the allegedly
neutral speech regulations while other protestors expressing a
different message were required to comply with the same regulations.
A somewhat similar predicament arises with regard to the
creation of a designated or limited public forum. Many of these
cases are relatively easy to resolve. If a university generally allows most student groups to use classrooms after-hours for
meetings and other expressive activities, it will be difficult for
the administration to insist that it has not created a designated
or limited public forum. But what if the administration is confronted with protests in administration buildings or other locations where student expressive activity is considered far less
appropriate and is prohibited by campus rules? If the administration repeatedly allows different protest groups to commandeer these facilities for ongoing protest activity, does there
reach a point where, by its conduct and practice, the university
may be held to have created a limited public forum for campus
107
protests in those specific locations? Here again, the demands
of free speech doctrine for uniformity of treatment may clash
with the practical exigencies that university administrators
confront in dealing with specific incidents on campus.
This difficulty is aggravated by free speech rules that prohibit government institutions from leaving decisions about who
may speak and how, and when and where particular expression
may occur, to the unbridled discretion of public officials. This
107. See, e.g., Waldrop, 162 F. Supp. 3d at 1279–85 (closely examining alleged exceptions to the university’s speech policy to determine whether in
practice it has created a far more open forum than its stated policy suggests).

1970

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[101:1943

long-standing requirement for traditional public forums has
108
been extended to non-public forums. There is certainly an argument to be made that, for free speech purposes, there is little
distinction between university speech regulations that can be
waived at an administrator’s discretion during student protests
and the kind of unbridled discretion regime that the First
Amendment prohibits.
II. THE EXTENT TO WHICH UNIVERSITY FACULTY
ENJOY ANY SPECIAL FIRST AMENDMENT ACADEMIC
FREEDOM
We next turn to the academic freedom enjoyed by faculty at
public universities. As noted above, faculty may enjoy freedom
to control curricula, classrooms, student research, and the like
when they are authorized by university higher-ups to do so, but
what First Amendment rights do they have when they clash
with university administrators and political oversight bodies?
Many public universities are grappling with these issues frequently and prominently these days. The two universities with
which we are associated are good examples: at the University of
Illinois (where one of us is now dean of the law school) a very
public controversy arose in the last few years surrounding the
(non)hiring of Steven Salaita based on the content of his
109
tweets; and at the University of California (where both of us
served as law professors for over two decades) the Office of the
President issued definitional guidance and, some would say,
threats to faculty and staff concerning so-called microagg110
ressions. These great public universities are two of many that
108. See, e.g., Children First Found., Inc. v. Fiala, 790 F.3d 328, 343–44 (2d
Cir. 2015) (finding that the unbridled discretion doctrine applies to non-public
forums).
109. Good background on the Steven Salaita controversy (involving the
university’s 2014 decision not to follow through with a tenured appointment
for Professor Salaita based on controversial tweets and other social media utterances he made) can be found in the Report on the Investigation into the
Matter of Steven Salaita. COMM. ON ACAD. FREEDOM & TENURE (CAFT), UNIV.
OF ILL. AT URBANA-CHAMPAIGN, REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION INTO THE
MATTER OF STEVEN SALAITA,
http://www.ais.illinois.edu/documents/
CAFTReport.pdf [hereinafter CAFT REPORT].
110. “Microaggressions,” which can lead to a legally actionable hostile
learning environment, are defined for these purposes as “the everyday verbal,
nonverbal, and environmental slights, snubs, or insults, whether intentional
or unintentional, that communicate hostile, derogatory, or negative messages
to target persons based solely upon their marginalized group membership.”
TOOL: RECOGNIZING MICROAGGRESSIONS AND THE MESSAGES THEY SEND,
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currently find themselves at the epicenter of conflict over freedom of expression at, and the orderly functioning of, public institutions of higher education.
In the space below, we briefly examine the breadth of socalled “academic freedom” enjoyed under the First Amendment
by (even fully tenured) faculty at public universities by comparing the scope of liberties of public professors with three relevant counterparts: public university students (discussed above),
non-professorial public employees, and private university professors. And again, we focus primarily on the liberties enjoyed
by virtue of the First Amendment—freedoms that arise from
other aspects of the Constitution such as due process, and nonconstitutional sources altogether (such as academic freedom
traditions, state statutes or constitutions, or contract law) are
important to be sure, but they will receive lesser attention in
our Article.
Notwithstanding talk in some Supreme Court cases about
the importance of “academic freedom” and the special role university faculties play in American democracy and society, it is
not clear that even tenured public university professors enjoy
any special expressive latitude, at least under the First
Amendment. Indeed, the First Amendment in many respects
protects public university students significantly more than faculty, because students are regulated individuals (as students
and/or residents of a campus community), whereas faculty are
government employees. Settled First Amendment doctrine
gives the government far more latitude to regulate the speech
of its workers than the speech of its citizenry, both because the
smooth functioning of government is an interest that is
weighed against free speech, and because (in some settings)
government itself speaks through its employees. These basic
notions are captured, in an overstated and somewhat flippant
way, by the quip of Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., who (while serving as a state appellate judge at the time) remarked in a case:
“The petitioner [a police officer] may have a constitutional right
to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a po111
liceman.” A more accurate, nuanced, and helpful explication
http://academicaffairs.ucsc.edu/events/documents/Microaggressions_
Examples_Arial_2014_11_12.pdf [hereinafter MICROAGGRESSION AVOIDANCE
GUIDE].
111. McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892). We
note that the modern Court has not embraced Justice Holmes’s reasoning to
its full logical conclusion.
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of these ideas has been provided by the Court in a series of cases involving the First Amendment and public employment
112
handed down over the last half century.
In Pickering v. Board of Education, a case involving a public teacher who was dismissed for writing and publishing a
letter in a newspaper criticizing, among other things, the Board
of Education’s fiscal policies and the job performance of the
Board’s superintendent, the Court made clear that “the State
has interests as an employer in regulating the speech of its
employees that differ significantly from those it possesses in
connection with regulation of the speech of the citizenry in
113
general.” Because of these interests, the government may
impose sanctions on expressive activities of government
employees even when such restraints “would be plainly
114
unconstitutional if applied to the public at large.”
Under the so-called “Pickering balancing test,” the
government’s interests in “promoting the efficiency of the
public services it performs through its employees” must be
115
weighed against the employee’s interest in free speech. At the
first stage, the employee must show that his or her speech
pertains to a matter of public concern (as opposed to a
workplace grievance) as to which there is a meaningful First
116
Amendment interest. At the second stage, the government
can prevail by showing that the employee’s speech—even if
relevant to public debate—does in fact interfere in a significant
117
way with the operations of the governmental unit in question.
Importantly, the Pickering framework does not allow the
government to use its authority as employer to “silence
discourse, not because it hampers public functions but simply
because superiors [in the government department or office]
118
disagree with the content of employees’ speech.”
119
the Court
A decade ago, in Garcetti v. Ceballos,
substantially refined the analysis to be undertaken in cases

112. See, e.g., Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006); United States v.
Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454 (1995); Rankin v. McPherson, 483
U.S. 378, 384 (1987); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
113. 391 U.S. at 568.
114. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. at 465.
115. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
116. Id. at 571–72.
117. Id. at 572–73.
118. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 384 (1987).
119. 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
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when public employers discipline employees for expressive
activities. The employee in Ceballos was a line district attorney
who wrote a memo challenging a police affidavit used to
support a warrant application, and who then claimed he was
improperly retaliated against for the written content and
120
advocacy contained in the memo. The Supreme Court ruled
that as long as “public employees [are] mak[ing] statements
pursuant to their official duties [as was true with the Ceballos
plaintiff ], the employees are not speaking as citizens for First
Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate
121
their communications from employer discipline,” even if the
matters on which they are speaking are of public concern. The
Ceballos Court, seemingly prompted by a comment in the
122
dissent about academic freedom, declined to decide whether
its new framework would apply to “speech related to
123
scholarship or teaching.”
The key distinction in Ceballos is between speech qua employee and speech qua citizen. What a public employee says as
part of his job—to fulfill his assigned duties—is not protected
by the First Amendment, even if it involves a matter of public
concern. Only what public employees say as citizens in their
private capacities receives constitutional protection. If Ceballos
were to apply to all academic settings, its speech-limiting ef120. Id. at 413–15.
121. Id. at 421.
122. Id. at 438–39 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“This ostensible domain beyond
the pale of the First Amendment is spacious enough to include even the
teaching of a public university professor, and I have to hope that today’s
majority does not mean to imperil First Amendment protection of academic
freedom in public colleges and universities, whose teachers necessarily speak
and write ‘pursuant to . . . official duties.’”); see also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 306, 329 (2003) (“We have long recognized that, given the important
purpose of public education and the expansive freedoms of speech and thought
associated with the university environment, universities occupy a special
niche in our constitutional tradition.”); Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S.
589, 603 (1967) (“Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic
freedom, which is of transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the
teachers concerned. That freedom is therefore a special concern of the First
Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over
the classroom. ‘The vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere
more vital than in the community of American schools.’” (quoting Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960))); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234,
250 (1957) (determining that a governmental inquiry into the contents of a
scholar’s lectures at a state university “unquestionably was an invasion of
[his] liberties in the areas of academic freedom and political expression—areas
in which government should be extremely reticent to tread”).
123. Ceballos, 547 U.S. at 425.
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fects would be obvious. No public educators would be protected
by First Amendment academic freedom with regard to on-thejob speech.
These limitations on free speech protection would not only
undermine academic freedom; they would raise difficult problems of application as well. Deciding what is on-the-job speech
is not always easy. The scope of what constitutes employee, as
opposed to citizen, speech can be unclear. With regard to K–12
instructors, perhaps all of a teacher’s statements during class
can be viewed as part of the job, but what of conversations with
students out of class, during lunch period, or before the school
day formally begins? More problematically, how do we determine the job parameters of university professors who are often
expected—as part of the scholarship and service components of
their job—to speak to government, the press, professional associations, and other audiences, and to publish articles and books
for diverse dissemination? If courts find such expression to be
part of the job, and unprotected, then university professors may
be punished for speaking in situations where they would have
the most impact—when their comments are based on their professional expertise. Far from having greater protection for their
speech than the average citizen under the rubric of academic
freedom, as many people might assume, education workers
would actually have much, much less. Most citizens do not risk
their livelihood when they publish articles or books or speak
out on public issues.
Perhaps in significant part because of these problems, the
federal courts of appeals have not uniformly or wholeheartedly
rushed to apply Ceballos to the higher education sphere, even
though it does seem regularly to be implemented in the K–12
realm. Regarding post-secondary instructors, the Seventh Circuit at least recognizes Ceballos’s arguable relevance, and has
at a high level of generality applied Ceballos’s teachings concerning “the appropriate weight to [be given] to the public employer’s interests,” even in cases where it believes the ruling in
124
Ceballos “is not directly” on point. By contrast, the Ninth and
Fourth Circuits have explicitly determined that Ceballos does
125
not govern First Amendment claims by university academics.

124. Piggee v. Carl Sandburg Coll., 464 F.3d 667, 672 (7th Cir. 2006).
125. Demers v. Austin, 746 F.3d 402, 406 (9th Cir. 2014) (per curiam); Lee
v. York Cty. Sch. Div., 484 F.3d 687, 694 n.11 (4th Cir. 2007).
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But even if Ceballos doesn’t absolutely eliminate public
professors’ First Amendment claims, the Pickering standard
(which courts that have not applied Ceballos to higher education continue to use) is already generous to public university
employers. Indeed, concerns over academic freedom may influence the decision by some courts to apply Pickering rather than
(the more absolutist) Ceballos, but academic freedom doesn’t do
much work in the cases thereafter and arguably is largely irrelevant to this analysis. Teachers and professors are public employees, no different than police officers or nurses. Under this
approach, public employee expression is protected when it addresses matters of public concern, but that protection is balanced against, and may be outweighed by, competing state interests. Ad hoc balancing tests are necessarily indeterminate
and uncertain in their application, and uncertainty chills
speech.
Moreover, taken literally, Pickering’s focus on whether
speech involves a matter of public concern seems to protect
some teachers more than others. Math professors may seldom
write on matters of public concern. Their academic freedom,
under this test, would be near non-existent. Social studies
teachers or law professors regularly speak and write on matters of public concern and would have much of their expression
protected to some extent, subject to the court’s balancing analysis. If differential equations ever become a public issue, professors who comment on it will receive free speech protection, too.
Perhaps the most pro-academic-freedom First Amendment
lower court case we have come across is Rodriguez v. Maricopa
County Community College District, in which the Ninth Circuit
spoke broadly—in the context of a community college professor’s seemingly racist emails which were distributed through
the college email system to all district employees—about the
need for public college teachers to have leeway under the First
Amendment because “[i]ntellectual advancement has tradition126
ally progressed through discord and dissent.” And the role of
colleges and universities in fostering that exchange “will not
survive if certain points of view [are] declared beyond the
127
pale.” For this reason, “[t]he desire to maintain a sedate academic environment . . . [does not] justify limitations on a teacher’s freedom to express himself on political issues in vigorous,

126. 605 F.3d 703, 708 (9th Cir. 2010).
127. Id.
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argumentative, unmeasured, and even distinctly unpleasant
128
terms.”
But as ambitious as the Rodriguez case was in its discussion of the First Amendment values of academic freedom, the
case was about a narrower issue—namely, whether the math
professor’s racist emails constituted harassment and thus created a hostile work environment under Title VII such that college administrators were remiss in not taking disciplinary ac129
tions against the professor. The court ruled that because the
emails weren’t targeted to anyone in particular, they did not
constitute harassment, and thus the administrators could not
130
be sued for failing to take action. There is language in the
case suggesting that the professor’s emails are protected from
131
sanction by the First Amendment, but such language is utter
dicta, since no disciplinary action was initiated. Moreover, the
broad dicta is itself not very thoroughly explicated, insofar as
the opinion nowhere discusses the fact that the professor was a
public employee; the opinion cites and quotes numerous cases
132
involving government regulation of private individuals but
never confronts, let alone overcomes, the power Pickering confers on government employers to avoid disruption.
All of the foregoing makes clear that, compared to students, public university faculty may enjoy considerably less expressive leeway in many circumstances. Consider, as an illustration, the University of California’s document providing
examples of impermissible microaggressions that we adverted
to earlier. No public university could even vaguely threaten a
student (as opposed to a faculty member) with punishment for
creating a hostile learning environment by using the phrase
“America is a melting pot”—no matter the context in which
133
that phrase was invoked. Nor could any public university impose negative consequences on a student for posting on social
media the intemperate (and in the minds of many people anti-

128. Id. at 708–09 (quoting Adamian v. Jacobsen, 523 F.2d 929, 934 (9th
Cir. 1975)).
129. Id. at 706–07.
130. Id. at 708–10.
131. Id. at 710–11.
132. See id. at 709 (invoking Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), which
held unconstitutional a state law forbidding the teaching of any subject in a
foreign language to students who had not yet passed the eighth grade).
133. See MICROAGGRESSION AVOIDANCE GUIDE, supra note 110.
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Semitic) comments that Steven Salaita—whose tenured position at the University of Illinois never materialized—tweeted.
Indeed, close inspection reveals that professors may fare
more poorly even than many other public university employees.
As the post-Pickering cases from the Supreme Court and lower
courts make clear, the kinds of government function disruption
that can justify discipline—disturbing harmony among coworkers, detrimental impact on close working relationships, interference with the speaker’s performance of duties—are the
very kinds of problems that arise often in the higher education
setting, where faculty must work closely with—and be trusted
by—students and fellow academics. Moreover, “[t]he burden of
caution employees bear with respect to the words they speak
will vary with the extent of authority and public accountability
134
the employee’s role entails.” One lower court has elaborated
on that point to say that “[t]he level of protection afforded to an
employee’s activities will vary with the amount of authority
and public accountability the employee’s position entails. A position requiring confidentiality, policymaking, or public contact
lessens the public employer’s burden in firing an employee for
135
expression that offends the employer.” And with regard to
educators, a public school teacher “is a position [that] by its
very nature requires a degree of public trust not found in many
136
other positions of public employment.”
Add to this the fact that government discrimination concerning the content of public professor speech is inevitable and
necessary in a way that is not true for other public employees.
Public university employers invariably must make decisions
about the hiring, promotion, and retention of professors based
on the content (even the viewpoint) of what these professors
say and write. The questions asked at hiring and promotion
stages—are the professor’s expressed views scientifically plausible, adequately supported, rigorously reasoned, appropriately
attentive to counterargument, etc.—are, at their core, contentbased inquiries. Even the Ninth Circuit ruling declining to apply Ceballos to higher education makes this clear:
[T]he evaluation of a professor’s writing for purposes of tenure or
promotion involves a judgment by the employing university about the
quality of what he or she has written. Ordinarily, such a content-

134. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 390 (1987).
135. Melzer v. Bd. of Educ., 336 F.3d 185, 197 (2d Cir. 2003) (citation omitted).
136. Id. at 198.
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based judgment is anathema to the First Amendment. But in the academic world, such a judgment is both necessary and appropriate.
Here too, recognizing our limitations, we should hesitate before concluding that we know better than the institution itself the nature and
137
strength of its legitimate interests.

If a building maintenance worker on campus prominently
proclaims his birther views, he may be immune from sanction.
But if an American history professor does, that shoddy evaluation of historical facts can be used against him in professional
assessments. Another example: many people think that the
constitutional Obamacare challenge was very weak analytical138
ly, even though it got four votes at the Supreme Court. If, five
years ago, a law dean decided not to go forward with someone’s
tenure file because she thought the candidate’s article laying
out what the author believed to be a forceful constitutional
challenge to Obamacare was poor scholarship, would the dean
be guilty of violating academic freedom?
To be sure, none of this means that public universities can
use their content-based authority over faculty as a means of
censoring political expression that is clearly citizen advocacy
and unrelated to one’s job as a professor. An administrator punishing a faculty member for urging, on her own time, the repeal
of Obamacare is different than the administrator determining
that the faculty member’s article arguing Obamacare is beyond
Congress’s constitutional powers is poor scholarship that cuts
against promotion.
Finally, perhaps most problematically, even under Pickering—the more pro-speech of the potentially applicable tests—
off-campus speech can sometimes affect credibility in school,
and First Amendment cases recognize that government may
sometimes take account of “off-the-job” expression in deciding
whether a person is fit to perform a public job. As one lower
court observed in allowing a school district to discipline a physics teacher for being an active and outspoken member of a
group (the North American Man/Boy Love Association) advocating sexual relationships between men and boys, the Pickering balancing test is “not limited to conduct occurring at or di-

137. Demers v. Austin, 746 F.3d 402, 413 (9th Cir. 2014).
138. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). For one
essay (before the Court’s ruling) explaining the weakness of the plaintiffs’
challenge, see Vikram David Amar, Reflections on the Doctrinal and BigPicture Issues Raised by the Constitutional Challenges to the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act (Obamacare), 6 FLA. INT’L L. REV. 9 (2010).
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139

rectly relating to the workplace.” Drawing on clear Supreme
Court directives, the court reminded that “[a]ttenuation of
time, place or content of speech from the workplace is ultimately accounted for in the balancing part of the process, but those
140
factors will not absolutely preclude government regulation.”
This contextual approach makes good practical sense and
has implications for professors, given the nature of their jobs: if
a university groundskeeper is the leader of a local KKK chapter, he is not (by virtue of his nonviolent KKK activities) incapable of being an effective groundskeeper. But if a public school
law professor is a KKK leader, can he really be effective and
credible in teaching minority (or white) students? Even protectors of academic freedom values that chafe against “civility” being used to rescind a faculty job offer distinguish between “civility” and “professional fitness,” which would encompass both
scholarly values and teaching effectiveness. The report by the
University of Illinois Committee on Academic Freedom and
Tenure on the Salaita matter (which contained significant criticism of the University of Illinois administration), for example,
tried to distinguish between “civility,” which was too vague a
basis on which to rescind a faculty job offer, and “professional
fitness,” a criteria for employment on which off-the-job and pri141
vate expressive activities could reasonably bear. Given this
reality and that the inherent nature of a professor’s job requires him to deal with a wide range of students in settings of
mutual trust, public professors must be more careful than
many (most) other public employees in what they say and do
even when they are away from the worksite.
Consider in this regard the very recent flap over the
Oregon law faculty member’s wearing of a costume that
included blackface at a private, off-campus Halloween party—
but one to which she invited students and faculty members.
According to press accounts, the tenured Oregon law professor,
Nancy Shurtz, was placed on paid administrative leave after
142
her use of blackface became known. University of Oregon
139. Melzer, 336 F.3d at 194.
140. Id.; see also Piggee v. Carl Sandburg Coll., 464 F.3d 667, 671 (7th Cir.
2006) (observing that instructor’s expressive actions at grocery store might
give rise to sanction since the “instructor/student relationship does not end the
moment the instructional period is over”).
141. See CAFT REPORT, supra note 109, at 23–31.
142. See, e.g., Rick Anderson, University of Oregon Censures White Professor for Wearing Blackface to Halloween Party, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 23, 2016),
http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-oregon-blackface-20161223-story.html.
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President Michael Schill, himself a former law dean, issued a
university statement saying: “We condemn [her] action
unequivocally as anathema to the University of Oregon’s
cherished values of racial diversity and inclusion. The use of
blackface, even in jest at a Halloween party, is patently
offensive and reinforces historically racist stereotypes. It was a
143
stupid act and is in no way defensible.”
Professor Shurtz explained that her costume was inspired
by Damon Tweedy, an African American doctor who penned the
bestselling memoir Black Man in a White Coat: A Doctor’s
Reflections on Race and Medicine: “I chose my costume based
on a book that I read and liked. . . . I thought I would be able to
teach with this costume. . . . I am sorry if it did not come off
144
well. I . . . would not want to offend.” Meanwhile, a letter
signed by twenty-three of her Oregon law faculty colleagues
calls for her resignation, saying “[i]f . . . you did in fact wear
blackface to a Halloween party, you need to resign. It doesn’t
matter what your intentions were. . . . Your actions implicate
145
all of us and our community.”
We think Professor Shurtz’s colleagues are wrong, even as
to First Amendment freedoms, about whether intent matters.
After all, the reason (correctly identified by those calling for her
resignation) that Shurtz’s actions warrant serious scrutiny is
that they may undermine her (and the university’s) trust and
credibility with students, alumni, and the community. But
wouldn’t students, alumni, and the outside world want to know
why she did what she did in deciding how much less they like
and trust her and the law school? If she did it to mock African
Americans (or merely “in jest” because she is flippant about
race), aren’t they likely to be much more angry and disaffected
than if she did it to support the cause of racial equality (like the
author of Black Like Me who feigned blackness to document
racism), even if her attempt was clumsy, ill advised, and ultimately counterproductive?
143. UO Leadership Speaks out About Unacceptable Behavior, AROUND O
(Nov. 1, 2016), http://around.uoregon.edu/content/uo-leadership-speaks-out
-about-unacceptable-behavior.
144. Ashley Collman, University of Oregon Law Professor Is Suspended After Dressing in Blackface at a Halloween Party, DAILY MAIL (Nov. 3, 2016),
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3901766/University-Oregon-law
-professor-suspended-dressing-blackface-Halloween-party.html.
145. Monique Judge, University of Oregon Law Professor Wears Blackface
Costume to Halloween Party, ROOT (Nov. 3, 2016), http://www.theroot.com/
university-of-oregon-law-professor-wears-blackface-cost-1790857570.
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But our bigger point here is that even if intent matters,
and even if the sanction of removal would seem hard to justify
under First Amendment principles, the university might be
able to impose some significantly lesser sanction on Professor
Shurtz’s seemingly negligent decision to speak in a way that
was likely to cause disruption to the university’s operations and
146
community relations. The fact that the university temporarily
suspended her shows it thought it had the power to do so; could
anyone imagine the university suspending its mailroom clerk
147
for the same unfortunate mistake?
Finally, a few words are in order about whether the modern framework described above is in any meaningful way a retreat from the “foundational” academic freedom cases from the
1950s and 1960s in which states were prevented from imposing
loyalty oaths and the like on public professors as a condition of
employment. To begin with, some of the most oft-cited language
about the First Amendment’s protection of university academic
freedom in these cases is drawn from dissents, not majority
opinions. For example, Justice Douglas’s dissenting language in
Adler v. Board of Education to the effect that academic freedom
is central to “the pursuit of truth which the First Amendment
148
was designed to protect” is frequently quoted by academic
freedom proponents, but less quoted is Justice Minton’s majority opinion, which observes—in a way that doesn’t fully capture
the nuance of the Pickering doctrine that would ensue—that
while
146. The University of Oregon has in an administrative proceeding reasserted its right to impose some sanction, even though the punishment to be
imposed has not yet been finally determined. For an argument supporting
freedom of expression in a university setting, see Eugene Volokh, Silencing
Professor Speech To Prevent Students from Being Offended – or from Fearing
Discrimination by the Professors, WASH. POST (Dec. 30, 2016), https://www
.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/12/30/silencing
-professor-speech-to-prevent-students-from-being-offended-or-from-fearing
-discrimination-by-the-professors; cf. Brown v. Chi. Bd. of Educ., 824 F.3d 713,
714 (7th Cir. 2016) (upholding a “stupid but constitutional” school policy imposing sanction for teacher’s use of the N-word, even though the teacher was
using it to illustrate why it shouldn’t be used and the harm that it causes, because the school policy forbade use of the word altogether).
147. See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 391 (1987) (differentiating
between employees who have regular contact with the public and other employees such as computer operators, electricians, and file clerks, who may be
more immune from sanction for their speech because of the less high-profile
positions they occupy).
148. 342 U.S. 485, 511 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting), overruled by
Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
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[i]t is clear that [public employees] have the right under our law to
assemble, speak, think and believe as they will . . . [i]t is equally clear
that they have no right to work for the State in the school system on
their own terms. . . . If they do not choose to work on [the terms offered by the state], they are at liberty to retain their beliefs and asso149
ciations and go elsewhere.

Once again, this simplistic and absolutist language from
Justice Minton doesn’t reflect current law, but we must remember that even as the cases reviewing attempts to rid civil
service of “subversives” were being decided, the government
employer element of the disputes was in the mix. More importantly, in these pre-Pickering cases, which the government
lost or should have lost, the government was not making the
specific showings of disruption to government operations needed to uphold public employee discipline; instead, it was arguing
that all civil service should be free of anyone who holds dangerous beliefs—not that a particular person’s belief, because of his
or her particular job, was in fact or in all predictive likelihood
going to interfere with government operations. Even today’s
framework that allows for significant government employer
leeway in the regulation of public employee expression does
not, as observed earlier, permit the government to use its
employer status to “silence discourse, not because it hampers
public functions but simply because superiors [in the
government department or office] disagree with the content of
150
employees’ speech” —precisely what government was trying to
do during the early Cold War.
As we have seen, from a First Amendment perspective, the
academic freedom of public university faculty is limited and
uncertain. However, free speech doctrine provides some protection to faculty expression, particularly with regard to offcampus political speech that is unrelated to a faculty member’s
duties as a professional academic. While some faculty speech
may straddle the line between the academic expression of an
employee that may be subject to university evaluation and control and related citizen commentary on public policy matters,
other speech activities—such as partisan political campaigning
or spiritual expression as part of a religious congregation—
cannot reasonably be subsumed under the rubric of academic
duties, however broadly they may be defined. Further, there
are clear constitutional grounds for restricting any state actor,

149. Id. at 492 (citation omitted).
150. Rankin, 483 U.S. at 384.
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including a university administration, from sanctioning such
political or religious expression.
When we compare public university professors’ rights to
those enjoyed by private university professor counterparts, we
see, on the one hand, that no such constitutional guarantees
protect faculty at private universities from restrictions on their
speech imposed by their employers. The private university, after all, is not a state actor. Indeed, the constitutional shoe is
very much on the other foot in this circumstance. To the extent
the First Amendment applies at all to an academic freedom
dispute between a private university and its faculty, it would
protect the right of the private university to choose and enforce
its own values. Freedom of speech, association, and religion all
coalesce to protect the autonomy of a private university, which
limits the speech of its faculty on or off campus. Legislation attempting to protect the academic freedom of private university
faculty would have to take account of these constitutional
guarantees.
Courts may consider the institutional autonomy and academic freedom of a public university as a state interest to be
balanced against the free speech rights of faculty. The state’s
interest in affirming the autonomy of its public universities in
disputes with faculty, however, is different than recognizing a
constitutional right to public university institutional autonomy
that protects the exercise of authority to restrict faculty speech.
On the constitutional ledger, private universities are protected
by the First Amendment against state interference in their
governance to some extent and they are not limited by it at all
when they restrict faculty speech.
Of course, on the other hand, a different analysis applies if
faculty of either a public or a private university are sanctioned
by non-university state actors for off-campus speech. Here, faculty would have the full panoply of free speech rights available
to any citizen. Faculty, like other public employees, only have
limited free speech rights when the government acts as their
employer—not when it acts in its general regulatory capacity.
If a faculty member is going to be arrested for inciting unlawful
conduct, for example, he or she would be protected under
Brandenburg v. Ohio against criminal sanction, unless he or
she intended “imminent lawless action” that was in fact likely
151
to ensue.
151. 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam).
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From a contemporary perspective, there is a strong cultural commitment to academic freedom at many private universities. That commitment extends to public universities as well.
Both institutions are subject to challenges from outside forces
who may exercise financial leverage over colleges: the taxpayers through the legislature for public universities and alumni
and other donors for private colleges. Constitutional law contributes to the resolution of those conflicts to only a limited extent—in favor of the faculty at public universities and in favor
of the institutional administration at private colleges.
III. POSTSCRIPT: BEYOND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Given the analyses and comparisons we have offered, in
which public professors often fare worse than their counterparts, the very term “academic freedom” as applied to the public professoriate may seem inapt—usually we think of “freedoms” as especially generous liberties or licenses, not watereddown rights. And yet there are several important ways in
which public professors do enjoy special “academic freedoms”
that we should note before concluding.
First, as we have written elsewhere, the First Amendment
is not the only constitutional provision arguably relevant to academic freedom; principles of due process and notice also play
152
an important role. Most people talk about academic freedom
in terms of a freedom to express ideas, but perhaps an important additional approach is to think about it as a freedom to
know what you can and cannot express. Vagueness and notice
protections have special applicability to the public education
setting, both at universities and at secondary schools. For example, think of K–12 teachers who get in trouble for teaching
controversial topics in ways later deemed improper by local authorities. Courts do and should make sure that public professors are not misled into expressing themselves in ways that
later could result in their sanction or dismissal. We need—and
the Constitution may require—clear ex ante standards that
eliminate chilling effects for public academics if the public
academy has any meaningful role to play in democracy. So, as
Eugene Volokh has pointed out, one of the most troubling aspects of the University of California’s microaggression guidance
document (even if the UC can constitutionally define and pun152. Vikram Amar & Alan Brownstein, Academic Freedom, 9 GREEN BAG
17, 25, 25 nn. 36–37 (2005).
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ish microaggressions quite broadly) is the chilling effect the in153
scrutability of the document creates. Even if government has
the authority to control the expression of its public professors,
it should be required to do so clearly, both to avoid due process
problems and to expose its censorial decisions to political heat
they deserve. In a related vein, in the Salaita affair—putting
the First Amendment aside—one of Mr. Salaita’s strongest
claims may arise from implicit promises made in the university’s offer letter about the extent to which his freedom of expres154
sion would be allowed.
And, as we hope we have made clear throughout this Article, another important kind of academic freedom is grounded
not in free speech or clear notice principles, but nonconstitutional sources altogether. As we noted in Part II, state
constitutions, contract law, industry practice, and the like may
give rise to legally or culturally binding rules that protect public professors, even as the contours of such rules will vary by
state and by university—and perhaps also by campus or even
department. Academic freedom is an important idea, even
apart from any First Amendment or other constitutional foot155
ing it enjoys.

153. See Eugene Volokh, UC Teaching Faculty Members Not To Criticize
Race-Based Affirmative Action, Call America “Melting Pot,” and More, WASH.
POST (June
16,
2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh
-conspiracy/wp/2015/06/16/uc-teaching-faculty-members-not-to-criticize-race
-based-affirmative-action-call-america-melting-pot-and-more.
154. The offer letter could be read to have incorporated academic freedom
principles embodied in the policies of the American Association of University
Professors. See CAFT REPORT, supra note 109, at Document 2.
155. See generally MATTHEW W. FINKIN & ROBERT C. POST, FOR THE COMMON GOOD: PRINCIPLES OF AMERICAN ACADEMIC FREEDOM (Yale Univ. Press
2009).

